Newsgroups: php.internals Path: news.php.net Xref: news.php.net php.internals:72324 Return-Path: Mailing-List: contact internals-help@lists.php.net; run by ezmlm Delivered-To: mailing list internals@lists.php.net Received: (qmail 35332 invoked from network); 6 Feb 2014 06:13:50 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO lists.php.net) (127.0.0.1) by localhost with SMTP; 6 Feb 2014 06:13:50 -0000 Authentication-Results: pb1.pair.com header.from=swhitemanlistens-software@cypressintegrated.com; sender-id=pass Authentication-Results: pb1.pair.com smtp.mail=swhitemanlistens-software@cypressintegrated.com; spf=pass; sender-id=pass Received-SPF: pass (pb1.pair.com: domain cypressintegrated.com designates 173.1.104.101 as permitted sender) X-PHP-List-Original-Sender: swhitemanlistens-software@cypressintegrated.com X-Host-Fingerprint: 173.1.104.101 rproxy2-b-iv.figureone.com Received: from [173.1.104.101] ([173.1.104.101:59226] helo=rproxy2-b-iv.figureone.com) by pb1.pair.com (ecelerity 2.1.1.9-wez r(12769M)) with ESMTP id A5/D4-09398-C1823F25 for ; Thu, 06 Feb 2014 01:13:49 -0500 Received: from bad.dop.co ([108.12.130.219]) by rproxy2-b-iv.figureone.com (Brand New Heavy v1.0) with ASMTP id SIT10642 for ; Wed, 05 Feb 2014 22:13:42 -0800 Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 01:13:39 -0500 Reply-To: Sanford Whiteman X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Message-ID: <1386084526.20140206011339@cypressintegrated.com> To: Pierre Joye In-Reply-To: References: <344075933.20140203143339@figureone.com> <617796370.20140204005840@cypressintegrated.com> <52F098F7.7000901@lsces.co.uk> <52F09D64.9020803@lsces.co.uk> <52F0A501.8030105@lsces.co.uk> <52F0ACC6.8030409@lsces.co.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [PHP-DEV] Re: Windows Peer Verification From: swhitemanlistens-software@cypressintegrated.com (Sanford Whiteman) Hey Pierre, re: the script to download the trusted CA bundle, how do you propose to make *that* connection secure the first time? Not being facetious. I was convinced (albeit suddenly) by Padraic's argument that all fault for insecure remote transfers lies with the developer as long as secure options exist. How do we avoid being that same kind of developer? Neither plain-text download nor unverified TLS should be used for the trusted CA root list. The ability to tamper with that download would be catastrophic. If we can't ship the CA bundle and can't ship even the CA cert for the site we choose to deliver the bundle, I think it's better to give people the URL and tell them to use a browser (which will perform verification). I was poking around and noticed that Mono's CLI for fetching the CA bundle (in this case Mozilla's) uses a plain http:// URL. I find this to be rather bizarre under the circumstances. [http://linux.die.net/man/1/mozroots] -- S.