Newsgroups: php.internals Path: news.php.net Xref: news.php.net php.internals:16973 Return-Path: Mailing-List: contact internals-help@lists.php.net; run by ezmlm Delivered-To: mailing list internals@lists.php.net Received: (qmail 93133 invoked by uid 1010); 28 Jun 2005 23:00:53 -0000 Delivered-To: ezmlm-scan-internals@lists.php.net Delivered-To: ezmlm-internals@lists.php.net Received: (qmail 93117 invoked from network); 28 Jun 2005 23:00:53 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO comcast.net) (127.0.0.1) by localhost with SMTP; 28 Jun 2005 23:00:53 -0000 Received: from ([127.0.0.1:13201]) by pb1.pair.com (ecelerity 1.2 r(5656M)) with ECSTREAM id 67/B9-00424-4A6D1C24 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2005 19:00:52 -0400 X-Host-Fingerprint: 204.127.198.39 rwcrmhc13.comcast.net NetCache Data OnTap 5.x Received: from ([204.127.198.39:54725] helo=rwcrmhc13.comcast.net) by pb1.pair.com (ecelerity 1.2 r(5656M)) with SMTP id 1C/F8-00424-732D1C24 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2005 18:42:00 -0400 Received: from [192.168.1.135] (pcp09278536pcs.eatntn01.nj.comcast.net[69.141.229.108]) by comcast.net (rwcrmhc13) with SMTP id <2005062822415501500bp4cke>; Tue, 28 Jun 2005 22:41:55 +0000 To: Russell Nelson Cc: internals@lists.php.net In-Reply-To: <17089.18702.450236.614561@desk.crynwr.com> References: <42BDDC82.6020208@ohgaki.net> <17088.52397.92440.326561@desk.crynwr.com> <42C0CF76.6090203@lerdorf.com> <42C0F4DA.4000605@php.net> <17089.18702.450236.614561@desk.crynwr.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=-d9gr879lK42n/+Q2wQZy" Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2005 18:43:00 -0400 Message-ID: <1119998580.13690.109.camel@localhost> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.2.1.1 Subject: Re: [PHP-DEV] allow_url_fopen should be INI_ALL From: ajb732@comcast.net (Al Baker) --=-d9gr879lK42n/+Q2wQZy Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit There is nothing wrong with fopen or include, and PHP isn't instrinically broken here. The only thing intrinsic about PHP that has anything to do with these security areas is how PHP is powerfully simple - lowering the bar for adoption. When you do this, you pick up newbie programmers who code up insecure applications. The bar also gets lowered for juvenile attackers who can easily browse and understand source code. Real software engineers - like those in the enterprise - know how to write secure code and look at how flexible PHP is and see an amazing tool to increase productivity. Turning PHP into a babysitter only hurts PHP, by restricting the enterprise / experienced developers, and curtailing innovation on how PHP is used. There are already solutions available for hosting companies that want a stop gap solution. I've even seen hosting companies that offer security consulting and can work with their customers to secure their site. Your "do this because Google proves it" argument only shows me that there are mainly educational articles on topics of security, and I would say that people are learning more about web security as time goes on - hence the high page rank of those articles. Using google to prove a point is both flawed and useless. I agree with Stefan's previous emails. Al On Tue, 2005-06-28 at 08:56 -0400, Russell Nelson wrote: > Stefan Esser writes: > > I agree with Rasmus. Remote URL Includes are dieing out. > > That's not what Rasmus said. > > > Most released advisories are SQL Injections nowadays and well maybe > > Russells next mail says: mysql_query() considered harmful. > > When the top Google result for 'php security flaw' returns > mysql_query() instead of include(), I will agree that you are correct. > > > Ohhh btw Russell, if you really consider include harmful, then simply > > install the Hardening-Patch for PHP and live with it. > > I'm not trying to fix this for me. Clearly there are at least a > half-dozen things I could do to fix the problem for myself[!]. I > believe that the problem's cause is the design of the language > intrinsic. Therefore, fixing the problem for myself doesn't address > the cause of the problem. It just prevents me from seeing the problem > anymore. The problem is still there. > > [!] The first six: > 1) rm -rf php > 2) don't allow my users access to php. > 3) audit all code written by my users. > 4) turn allow_url_fopen off. > 5) install Hardening. > 6) write my own patch removing url_fopen capability from 'include'. > > -- > --My blog is at blog.russnelson.com | If you want to find > Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | injustice in economic > 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315-323-1241 | affairs, look for the > Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | | hand of a legislator. > --=-d9gr879lK42n/+Q2wQZy--